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INTRODUCTION

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”)1 is often heralded as
one the most effective pieces of social legislation enacted by
Congress.2 Originally signed into law in 1965 at the height of the
* Executive Editor, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law. J.D.
Candidate, 2010, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2005, University of
Rochester. The Author would like to thank Wade Henderson, Julie Fernandes,
and Debo Adegbile for their mentorship, as well as the editorial staff of the Journal
of International Law for their hard work. Above all, the Author is grateful to his
parents for their guidance and inspiration.
1 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2006)).
2 See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 927–28 (1995) (commenting that the
VRA “has been of vital importance in eradicating invidious discrimination from
the electoral process and enhancing the legitimacy of our political institutions”);
Hugh Davis Graham, Voting Rights and the American Regulatory State, in
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 177, 177 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler
Davidson eds., 1992) (noting that the Voting Rights Act is “one of the most
effective instruments of social legislation in the modern era of American reform”);
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Civil Rights Movement, the VRA outlaws racial discrimination in
voting, and has played a major role in reshaping American
democracy. After nearly 100 years of Jim Crow, the VRA helped
“shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of
evil to its victims,”3 adding teeth to the Fifteenth Amendment’s
promise that the right to vote “shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.”4 Today, after more than 40 years
of implementation, the VRA has contributed to substantial
increases in the rates of minority voter participation and electoral
success.5 In 2006, Congress reauthorized core provisions of the
VRA for twenty-five years, finding that—despite incredible
gains—discrimination in voting remains a significant roadblock to
full minority political participation.6
In so doing, Congress reaffirmed a strong expression of federal
legislative power, allowing the federal government to insert itself
into state and local elections in order to thwart racial
discrimination in voting. Nevertheless, the continuing vitality of
the federal government’s power to confront racial discrimination in
voting through the VRA is uncertain. The Supreme Court has
shown a willingness to limit the reach of the VRA and, more
generally, Congress’s power to remedy racial discrimination
perpetrated by state and local governments. For example, in a
series of cases in the 1990s, the Court used the Equal Protection
Clause to strike down redistricting plans in which state and local
governments used race as a factor in reapportionment in order to
George W. Bush, Statement on Legislation to Reauthorize the Voting Rights Act,
42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCS. 1371 (July 20, 2006) (describing the Voting Rights
Act as “one of the most important pieces of legislation in our Nation’s history”).
3 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
5 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, PROTECTING MINORITY
VOTERS: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AT WORK 1982–2005, at 36–49 (Feb. 2006), available
at http://www.lawyerscommittee.org/admin/voting_rights/documents/files/0
023.pdf (noting statistically that there have been vast increases in minority voting
participation and the number of minority elected officials since passage of the
VRA).
6 See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, & Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–246, §§ 2, 4–5, 120
Stat. 577 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1973b-1973c (West 2003 & Supp.
2007)) (“[V]estiges of discrimination in voting continue to exist as demonstrated
by second generation barriers constructed to prevent minority voters from fully
participating in the electoral process.”).
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comply with the VRA and help minorities elect candidates of their
choice.7
Most recently, in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No.
One (NAMUDNO) v. Holder, decided in 2009, the Supreme Court
cast doubt on the constitutionality of the VRA’s “preclearance”
component, which requires all or part of sixteen states with
particularly egregious histories of racial discrimination to acquire
“preclearance” from the federal government before administering
any changes in election or voting law.8 Preclearance, established
by Section 49 and Section 510 of the VRA, is regarded as the heart of
the VRA’s protections.11 Although ultimately passing on the
constitutionality of preclearance and, instead, ruling narrowly on
statutory grounds, Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in
NAMUDNO mused considerably over the constitutionality of
Congress’s decision in 2006 to reauthorize preclearance for twentyfive years.12 The opinion questioned whether sufficient evidence of
racial discrimination by state and local governments justified
Congress’s decision to reauthorize preclearance, expressing

7 See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (holding, inter alia, that compliance
with Section 5 of the VRA is not a sufficiently compelling governmental interest to
justify the use of race in districting); Miller, 515 U.S. at 917–20 (1995) (holding that
strict scrutiny will be applied to analyzing the constitutionality of apportionment
if voting districts are bizarrely shaped and it is proven that race was a
“predominant” factor in drawing district lines); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)
(holding that the use of race in drawing election districts is permissible only if the
government can show that it is necessary to achieve a compelling governmental
interest).
8 Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009)
[hereinafter NAMUDNO].
9 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(b) (2006).
10 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006).
11 Drew S. Days III, Section 5 and the Role of the Justice Department, in
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING, supra note 2, at 52–53.
12 NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2511–13. In the Court’s slip opinion, the majority
opinion comprises just over 16 pages. Three and a half of those pages discuss
“serious constitutional questions” that the VRA presents, and an additional two
pages discuss why the Court avoided resolution of such constitutional questions.
Id. See also Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts versus Roberts: Just How Radical Is the Chief
Justice?, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 11, 2010, at 17–18, available at
http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/roberts-versus-roberts?page=0,1
(noting
that the Court was originally set on “issuing a sweeping 5-4 decision, striking
down the Voting Rights Act on constitutional grounds” but—whether for
strategic or other reasons—eventually backed off and issued a narrower decision
on statutory grounds).
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concern that preclearance may violate “our historic tradition that
all the States enjoy ‘equal sovereignty.’”13
Some commentators have read the opinion as “unambiguously
serv[ing] notice that the Justices are prepared to invalidate the
[preclearance regime].”14 Indeed, coupled with decisions issued
earlier in the 2000s in which the Court chose to read narrowly core
provisions of the text of the VRA,15 the Court has unmistakably
charted a course toward limiting congressional power to combat
state and local racial discrimination in voting.
The VRA is a critical component of civil rights enforcement in
the United States and has been the subject of several Supreme
Court cases. As a result, a flurry of scholarship has emerged
regarding the VRA.16 Absent from such scholarship has been any
13 NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2512. See also id. (“The statute’s coverage formula
is based on data that is now more than 35 years old, and there is considerable
evidence that it fails to account for current political conditions.”).
14 Posting of Tom Goldstein to SCOTUSblog, Analysis: Supreme Court
Invalidates Section 5’s Coverage Scheme, http://www.scotusblog.com/2009/06
/analysis-supreme-court-invalidates-section-5%E2%80%99s-coverage-scheme-2
(June 22, 2009, 13:13 EST). See also Voting Rights Act—Preclearance: Northwest
Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder, 123 HARV. L. REV. 362, 369 (2009)
(“[T]he opinion appears to invite Congress to reconsider the various aspects of the
VRA that raise the most serious constitutional concerns for the Court.”); Posting
of Richard H. Pildes to Room for Debate: A Running Commentary on the News, A
Warning to Congress http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/22/thebattle-not-the-war-on-voting-rights/ (June 22, 2009, 13:15 EST) (noting that Justice
Roberts in the opinion “strongly intimates that Section 5 might be living on
borrowed time”).
15 See, e.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009) (interpreting Section 2
of the VRA to require minority groups to constitute a numerical majority of the
voting-age population in a geographically compact area before proceeding on a
claim of vote dilution); Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003) (reading Section 5
of the VRA to permit States and local governments to spread minority voters
across many districts, which might have the effect of diluting minority voting
strength, rather than interpreting Section 5 to require States and local
governments to draw district lines so minority voters have an ability to elect
candidates of their choice); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000)
(holding that the Justice Department must approve certain racially discriminatory
voting changes under Section 5, even if the Justice Department determines that
the discrimination was intentional).
16 Recently,
commentators have been eager to write about the
constitutionality of Section 5 of the VRA. See, e.g., Kristen Clarke, The
Congressional Record Underlying the 2006 Voting Rights Act: How Much
Discrimination Can the Constitution Tolerate?, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385, 394–95
(2008) (arguing that the congressional record underlying the reauthorization of
the VRA supports the constitutionality of the VRA); Nathaniel Persily, The Promise
and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174, 189–90 (2007)
(recounting how the issue of whether the Section 5 is constitutional was central to
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discussion of the role the VRA plays in helping the United States
adhere to its international treaty obligations under the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination17 (“CERD”) and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).18
This Comment addresses this overlooked aspect of the VRA,
arguing that the extraordinary enforcement mechanism provided
by the VRA uniquely facilitates U.S. compliance with international
law in ways otherwise unattainable. As an unusually strong
expression of federal power, the VRA overcomes impediments to
U.S. adherence to its international human rights obligations.
The VRA represents one of the few federal statutory
mechanisms in that it prohibits governmental conduct that has the
purpose and/or effect of discriminating on the basis of race.19 This
standard of discrimination is binding on all jurisdictions within the
United States and can be enforced proactively by individuals and
the U.S. government. Nevertheless, beginning with the Rehnquist
court, the Supreme Court has set new limitations on congressional
power to combat racial discrimination.20 While these limitations
certainly affect domestic law in that national standards set by
Congress are met with increased judicial scrutiny, they also
implicate U.S. capabilities to adhere to international human rights
treaty obligations. Thus, the debate over Congressional power to
enforce equal protection and fundamental rights encompasses
more than national interests: it touches on international law. For
the debate surrounding reauthorization of Section 5 in 2006); Pamela S. Karlan,
Section 5 Squared: Congressional Power To Extend and Amend the Voting Rights Act, 44
HOUS. L. REV. 1, 27–31 (2007) (arguing that Congress had the authority to
reauthorize Section 5 of the VRA); Abigail Thernstrom, Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act: By Now, a Murky Mess, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 41, 46 (2007) (arguing
that Section 5 is unconstitutional and unnecessary).
17 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Nov. 20, 1994, 1966 U.S.T. 521, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter
CERD].
18 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 1966
U.S.T. 521, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
19 Apart from the VRA, Title VII remains the most notable federal effort to
bar effects-based racial discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006). Note,
however, that at least one Supreme Court justice has recently questioned the
constitutionality of Title VII’s disparate impact standard. See Ricci v. DeStefano,
129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682–83 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that, as applied
to government employers, Title VII’s disparate impact standard may violate the
Equal Protection Clause).
20 See infra text accompanying notes 87–89.
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this reason, proponents of “bringing human rights home”21 can
find in the VRA a vehicle that brings the United States into closer
compliance with its international obligations. Likewise, to the
extent that appeals to international law can persuade the Supreme
Court and those charged with administering the VRA, advocates
for a strong VRA and for providing Congress with more latitude to
enforce the Reconstruction Amendments should consider the role
that the VRA plays in allowing the United States to adhere to
international human rights law.
After tracing the development of human rights law as part of
American law, Section 2 of this Comment discusses the United
States’ relatively recent adoption of the CERD and ICCPR. It then
analyzes how U.S. interpretation of the CERD and ICCPR has
limited the effectiveness of the United States’ ability to adhere to
both treaties. Section 3 argues that, despite the United States’
failure to adhere fully to the CERD and ICCPR, the VRA has
helped the United States move closer toward complying with
international voting rights norms because of (i) the statute’s
definition of discrimination, (ii) its unique “preclearance”
component, and (iii) its granting of a private right of action.
Finally, the Comment concludes in Section 4 by exploring whether
this insight into the operation of the VRA can be applied to
enforcing other human rights norms within the United States, and
the impact that limits on congressional power to enforce the
Reconstruction Amendments will have on U.S. adherence to
human rights treaty obligations.
2.

BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME

2.1. Past as Prologue
Human rights are central to the United States’ history. Over
200 years ago, the Declaration of Independence stated that people
are endowed with inherent, inalienable rights by virtue of being
human.22 Over 60 years ago, the United States helped end
21 See generally BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME (Cynthia Soohoo et al. eds.,
2008) (containing essays and articles by various authors on the importance of and
values served by more robustly applying international human rights norms to
conduct within the United States).
22 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (“[A]ll men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”).
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genocide during World War II and then played an instrumental
role in establishing international institutions aimed at securing and
protecting human rights.23 Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms
speech partly inspired the drafting of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.24 His wife, Eleanor Roosevelt, served as Chair of
the Commission on Human Rights and drafted part of the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights.25
Even so, international human rights norms have played a
minor role in legal efforts to pursue fundamental rights, justice,
and equality within the United States. Lurking behind the
Declaration of Independence stood the ugliness of slavery. While
Franklin D. Roosevelt was calling for a redefinition of “security” to
include human security in his Four Freedoms speech, African
Americans were condemned to live in “separate but equal”
societies and Japanese Americans were sent to internment camps.
In the wake of World War II, while the United States played a
leading role in “the founding of the United Nations and the
drafting of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights, the reality for
African Americans was the complete antithesis of the principles
being advanced on the international level.”26
Instead of confronting this schism by bringing its own practices
in line with the international norms it helped to create, the United

23 See JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
ORIGIN, DRAFTING AND INTENT 1–2 (1999) (describing how Franklin and Eleanor
Roosevelt helped inspire the movement to push for international human rights).
See also GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND
MODERN DEMOCRACY 1019 (Transaction Publishers 1996) (1944) (discussing, in
1944, the leadership role that the United States will play in democratizing the
world and democratizing former colonies and particularly noting that
“[d]eclarations of inalienable human rights for people all over the world are now
emanating from America”).
24 See MORSINK, supra note 23, at 1–2 (describing Roosevelt’s State of the
Union in which he addressed “four freedoms” as a catalyst for early human rights
advocates).
25 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, art. 1,
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) (“All human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of
brotherhood.”); see also Gay J. McDougall, Toward a Meaningful International
Regime: The Domestic Relevance of International Efforts to Eliminate All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, 40 HOW. L.J. 571, 575 (1997) (noting that Eleanor Roosevelt
assumed an “international leadership role[] in the founding of the United Nations
and the drafting of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights”).
26 McDougall, supra note 25.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

1156

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 31:4

States retreated from the burgeoning system of universal rights.27
The United States failed to join the most significant human rights
treaties created in furtherance of the goals set out in the United
Nations Charter28 and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights29—two documents heavily influenced by U.S. participation.
Isolationists and advocates for segregation in the name of “states’
rights” were able to find common ground in the pursuit of
preventing international scrutiny of Jim Crow.30 The Cold War
and McCarthyism intervened to shift the focus of U.S. social justice
activists away from demanding economic and social rights, which
were thought to have too close a resemblance to communism.
Instead, U.S. advocates turned their attention to achieving civil
rights that had greater appeal domestically, such as voting rights
and employment discrimination.31
The international institutions established after World War II
presented a new opportunity for civil rights advocates in the
United States. With the legacy of Nazi Germany’s doctrine of
racial supremacy lingering in the background, the drafters of the
U.N. Charter made clear their desire to establish the United
Nations in order to attain “human rights . . . for all without
distinction as to race.”32 In 1947, following the creation of the
Human Rights Commission of the United Nations, the NAACP
filed a petition under the leadership of W.E.B. Du Bois—An Appeal
to the World—which called for the Human Rights Commission to
investigate the conditions under which African Americans lived in

27 See id. at 576 (describing how the U.S. distanced itself from the U.N. human
rights treaty regime).
28 U.N. Charter, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993.
29 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 25.
30 See Carol Anderson, A “Hollow Mockery”: African Americans, White
Supremacy, and the Development of Human Rights in the United States, in 1 BRINGING
HUMAN RIGHTS HOME, A HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 90
(Cynthia Soohoo et al. eds., 2008) (explaining that an “’evil combination’ of GOP
and Dixiecrats, as the NAACP called it, charged that the U.S. Constitution and
America were under attack by human rights, human rights proponents, and the
United Nations, as that foreigner-dominated organization set out to subvert
American values with socialistic, even communistic, ideas about freedom and
democracy”).
31 See Preface to 1 BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME: A HISTORY OF HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES, at ix (Cynthia Soohoo et al. eds., 2008) (discussing
impediments to appealing to international human rights in the U.S. following
creation of the United Nations).
32 U.N. Charter, supra note 28, art. 1, para. 3.
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the United States.33 Although the petition was defeated (and
opposed by the United States) in a U.N. Sub-Commission, the
petition was well-publicized and helped influence the U.S.
government.34
The efforts of Du Bois and others seeking to leverage
international human rights law as a tool for reform within the
United States met considerable resistance in the early 1950s from
Senator John W. Bricker of Ohio, who led a movement to amend
the Constitution to alter the treaty approval process. In 1920, the
Supreme Court held in Missouri v. Holland that an act of Congress
pursuant to a validly executed treaty could go beyond Congress’s
otherwise enumerated powers and still remain constitutional
pursuant to the Tenth Amendment, provided that such an act of
Congress did not violate an express provision of the Constitution.35
Thus, under Holland, when enforcing the mandate of a treaty,
Congress can enact legislation that binds states through the
Supremacy Clause in ways that otherwise might run afoul of
federalism constraints.36 For Senator Bricker and his followers,
Holland was a threat to state sovereignty and, if coupled with
emerging human rights treaties, could enable a serious disruption
of segregation and the Cold War.37
Senator Bricker’s amendment—commonly referred to as “the
Bricker Amendment”—was introduced in many forms. At its core,
it aimed to make U.S. accession to any international human rights
treaty nearly impossible. Various versions of the treaty would
have required Senate ratification of executive agreements in
addition to treaties, that both types of agreements (executive
33 See Anderson, supra note 30, at 89 (discussing the strength of the NAACP’s
petition).
34 See Stanley A. Halpin, Looking Over a Crowd and Picking Your Friends: Civil
Rights and the Debate Over the Influence of Foreign and International Human Rights
Law on the Interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, 30 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
1, 5–6 (2006) (discussing the impact that An Appeal to the World and other petitions
filed to international bodies had on U.S. diplomatic relations).
35 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
36 See id.
37 See Halpin, supra note 34, at 8; see also United States Policy Regarding the
Draft United Nations on Human Rights: The 1953 Change, in 3 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES 1952-1954, at 1550–51 (1952) (“Covenants would be a source of
propaganda attack on positions taken by the United States and on conditions
within this country. The Covenants might contain provisions on economic selfdetermination and the right of nationalization which would be detrimental to
United States interests in certain areas abroad.”).
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agreements and treaties) pass through both houses of Congress
with enabling legislation, and that such agreements gain approval
in all 48 state legislatures.38 The Bricker Amendment would have
effectively overruled Holland, leaving all treaties as non-selfexecuting (i.e., not enforceable in U.S. courts) without enabling
legislation. Senator Bricker clearly stated his purpose as it related
to what would eventually become the ICCPR. He wanted “‘to
bury the so-called Covenant on Human Rights so deep that no one
holding high public office will ever attempt its resurrection.’”39
Ultimately,
vigorous
lobbying
by
the
Eisenhower
Administration succeeded in derailing the Bricker Amendment by
promising that the United States would not agree to any future
human rights treaties.40 As a result of Eisenhower’s pledge, the
United States did not participate in the development and drafting
of CERD and ICCPR, and neither treaty was ratified by the United
States until the Clinton Administration.41
2.2. Ratification and General Obligations of the CERD and ICCPR
The International Convention on the Elimination of All forms
of Racial Discrimination was adopted by the U.N. General
The
Assembly and opened for signature in late 1965.42
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was adopted
and opened for signature the next year.43 Yet, neither treaty was
submitted to the Senate for ratification until the Carter
Administration,44 and both treaties lingered in the Senate until the
Clinton Administration. The Senate ratified the ICCPR in 199245
and two years later ratified the CERD.46 Under the Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, both treaties are the law of the

38 See Anderson, supra note 30, at 91 (discussing the requirements under the
Bricker amendment).
39 Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of
Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341, 349 (1995).
40 See id.
41 See McDougall, supra note 25, at 576.
42 CERD, supra note 17.
43 ICCPR, supra note 18.
44 See HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT:
LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 1135 (3d ed. 2008).
45 See 138 CONG. REC. 8,068–71 (1992) (ratifying the ICCPR).
46 See 140 CONG. REC. 14,326–27 (1994) (ratifying the CERD).
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United States, having the same effect as an act of Congress.47 The
CERD attacks racial discrimination across a broad array of rights.
Meanwhile, the ICCPR requires its signatories to protect a more
defined set of civil and political rights. In addition, unlike the
CERD, the ICCPR mandates that State signatories protect citizens
and non-citizens alike.48
Together, the ICCPR and the CERD firmly establish the
fundamental human right to political participation, regardless of
race, color, national origin, and ethnic origin. The ICCPR contains
a general statement of nondiscrimination, elaborating in Article
2(1) that each party to the ICCPR must guarantee “rights
recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”49
Article 1 of the CERD bans racial discrimination, which it defines
as:
[A]ny distinction . . . based on race . . . which has the
purpose or effect of . . . nullifying or impairing the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political,
economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.50
The ICCPR and the CERD collectively prohibit governmental
conduct that has the purpose or effect of racial discrimination.
Both treaties confer affirmative obligations upon their
signatories to pursue policies in furtherance of guaranteeing the
right to political participation free from racial discrimination.
Under the CERD, States are required to refrain from engaging in
racial discrimination and to act affirmatively “to amend, rescind or
nullify any laws and regulations which have the effect of creating
or perpetuating racial discrimination . . . . ”51 Article 2 of the
47 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. (“[A]ll Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . .
. ”).
48 Compare CERD, supra note 17, art. 1(2) (“This Convention shall not apply to
distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by a State Party to this
Convention between citizens and non-citizens.”), with ICCPR, supra note 18, art.
2(1) (establishing that each party to the covenant must ensure equal rights to all
individuals within its territory).
49 ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 2(1).
50 CERD, supra note 17, art. 1(1).
51 Id. art. 2(1)(c).
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ICCPR contains a similar provision.52 Whereas Article 1 of the
CERD exempts affirmative action programs from the definition of
discrimination, Article 2 of the CERD—in addition to Article 2 of
the ICCPR—mandates State parties to engage in affirmative action
when necessary. That is, States are not only permitted to engage in
affirmative action programs, but—in some instances—required to
do so.
Moreover, signatories of the CERD agree not only to comply
with the treaty’s terms at the national level, but at all levels of
government.53 The CERD specifically contemplates that States
have an obligation to implement its terms at all levels of
government—in the United States’ case, at state and local levels. In
less specific language, the ICCPR also requires implementation of
its terms at all levels of government, requiring that each State Party
to the ICCPR “undertake[] to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the [ICCPR].”54
The mandates not to discriminate laid out in the CERD and
ICCPR apply to the right to free political participation. The CERD
generally guarantees equal protection under the law and
enumerates specific civil, political and social rights that States are
prohibited from interfering with through discriminatory conduct.55
Specifically, Article 5(c) of the CERD requires State Parties to
“undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination . . . to
guarantee . . . the enjoyment of . . . the right[] to participate in
elections—to vote and to stand for election—on the basis of
universal and equal suffrage.”56 Likewise, Article 25 of the ICCPR
guarantees the right to vote without “distinctions” and
“unreasonable restrictions.”57

52 See ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 2(2) (“[E]ach State Party . . . undertakes . . . to
adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the
rights recognized in the present Covenant.”).
53 See id. art. 2(3)(c) (“Each State Party . . . undertakes . . . [t]o ensure that the
competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.”).
54 Id. art. 2(1).
55 See CERD, supra note 17, art. 5 (obliging states to prohibit and eliminate
discrimination as to race, color, ethnic, and national origin).
56 Id. art. 5(c).
57 ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 25.
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Under international law, the United States is bound to carry
out treaty obligations to which it has assented.58 International
enforcement of both treaties is left to a combination of monitoring
bodies that rely on periodic reporting by State Parties, complaints
by States Parties, and—upon a State Party’s consent—individual
complaints.59 However, under the ICCPR, a State Party is not
subject to the State Party complaint mechanism unless it separately
declares the competence of the Human Rights Commission to
receive and consider complaints.60 Likewise, a State Party is not
subject to the ICCPR’s individual complaint mechanism unless it
assents to the ICCPR’s First Optional Protocol. The United States
has declared the Human Rights Commission competent to hear
State Party complaints61 but has not ratified the ICCPR’s First
58 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 735 (2004) (declaring that “the
[ICCPR] does bind the United States as a matter of international law”); Henkin,
supra note 39, at 346 (“International law requires the United States to carry out its
treaty obligations . . .”).
59 See CERD, supra note 17, arts. 8–9 (establishing a Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination to monitor compliance with the CERD and
requiring States Parties to submit periodic reports on laws and other measures
that have been adopted in furtherance of the provisions of the CERD); id. art. 11
(allowing a State Party to file a complaint if such a State Party believes that
another State Party is failing to give effect to provisions of the CERD); id. art. 14
(allowing individual complaints from a State Party if such a Party has
“recognize[d] the competence of the Committee to receive and consider
communications from individuals or groups of individuals within its
jurisdiction”); ICCPR, supra note 17, arts. 28, 40 (establishing a Human Rights
Committee to monitor compliance with the ICCPR and require State Parties to
submit periodic reports); id. art. 41 (allowing a State Party to file a complaint that
another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under the ICCPR); Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 2, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976)
(permitting individuals who have exhausted all available domestic remedies and
who have asserted violation of their rights under the ICCPR to submit a written
communication to the Human Rights Committee on the condition that the written
communication concerns a State Party which is a party to the Optional Protocol).
60 See ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 41(1) (giving State Parties recourse to the
Human Rights Committee in situations where a State Party feels that “another
State is not fulfilling its obligations under the present Covenant”).
61 See U.S. Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,
June
8,
1992,
1676
U.N.T.S.
543,
545,
available
at
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_
no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec [hereinafter ICCPR RUDs] (“The United
States declares that it accepts the competence of the Human Rights Committee to
receive and consider communications under article 41 in which a State party
claims that another State party is not fulfilling its obligations under the
Covenant.”).
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Optional Protocol,62 thereby disallowing individual complaints
under the ICCPR.
Unlike the ICCPR, States automatically recognize the
competence of the CERD monitoring body—the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination—to consider complaints by
other State Parties, and the International Court of Justice maintains
a form of appellate jurisdiction over disputes before the CERD’s
monitoring body.63 However, the United States has unilaterally
declared that it is not subject to the International Court of Justice
without consent.64 In addition, to date, no State Party has
attempted to avail itself of this procedure.65 Furthermore, the
CERD’s individual complaint mechanism hinges on whether a
State Party has recognized the competence of the monitoring body
to hear complaints related to that State’s conduct,66 and the U.S.
has not made such recognition.67
As a result of the United States’ maneuvers related to the
respective monitoring bodies and complaint mechanisms of the
ICCPR and CERD, the United States is subject to little international
enforcement of its obligations under both treaties. For the United
States, what is left of the international enforcement mechanisms
provided by the ICCPR and CERD amount to each treaty’s
reporting requirements, which initiate a healthy process of

62 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, March 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 302, available at http://www2.ohchr
.org/english/law/pdf/ccpr-one.pdf.
63 See CERD, supra note 17, art. 11 (governing recourse to the Committee
when other State Parties are not “giving effect to the provisions of [the]
Convention”); id. art. 22 (granting the ICJ jurisdiction to hear appeals).
64 See U.S. Ratification of the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Oct. 21, 1994, 1830 U.N.T.S. 284, 285, available
at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV2&chapter=4&lang=en [hereinafter CERD RUDs] (“[B]efore any dispute to which
the United States is a party may be submitted to the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice under this article, the specific consent of the United
States is required in each case.”).
65 See
Human Rights Bodies—Complaints Procedures: Inter-State
Complaints,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/petitions/index.htm
#interstate (last visited Apr. 10, 2010) (noting that the inter-state complaint
procedures have never been used).
66 See CERD, supra note 17, art. 14 (“A State Party may at any time declare
that it recognizes the competence of the committee to consider communications
from individuals . . . claiming to be victims of a violation by that State Party of . . .
rights set forth in this Convention.”).
67 See CERD RUDs, supra note 64.
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introspection by the United States and potential criticism by the
international community, but remain void of any threat of
sanctions.
2.3. Roadblocks to Implementation
In part, robustly applying human rights norms within the
United States serves America’s legacy of support for inalienable
rights around the globe. The ability of the United States to hold
other States accountable for their human rights abuses is affected
by its own commitment to enforcing human rights norms. By
promoting a principled human rights policy within its borders, the
United States can gain credibility abroad when it criticizes the
human rights policies of other countries.68 Yet, as discussed, the
United States has been wary of holding its own policies to
international human rights standards.
When the Senate ratified both the CERD and ICCPR, it issued
an accompanying “package” of reservations, understandings, and
declarations (“RUDs”) that constrain the capacity for U.S.
adherence to both treaties.69 Thus, although the Supremacy Clause
states that “all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby . . . . ,”
70 the Constitution is seemingly clear language is obscured by the
RUDs attached to both the CERD and ICCPR. Although the terms
of the right to political participation guaranteed by the CERD and
ICCPR may be broader than current U.S. policies, the RUDs
68 See President Barack Obama, Remarks at the Acceptance of the Nobel
Peace Prize (Dec. 10, 2009) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/remarks-president-acceptance-nobel-peace-prize (“America—in fact, no
nation—can insist that others follow the rules of the road if we refuse to follow
them ourselves. For when we don’t, our actions can appear arbitrary, and
undercut the legitimacy of future interventions, no matter how justified.”). See
also WILLIAM F. SCHULZ, Introduction to THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: U.S. POLICY
FOR A NEW ERA 13–14 (William F. Schulz ed., 2008) (recommending that the new
administration conform its practices to international standards on human rights,
otherwise the “United States will never reclaim its reputation for human rights
leadership . . . “).
69 See ICCPR RUDs, supra note 61, at 543–45 (laying out the U.S. reservations,
declarations, and understandings with respect to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights).
70 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added); see also JORDAN J. PAUST,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 99–105, 120 (2d ed. 2003)
(discussing the clash between treaty law and U.S. domestic law and examining the
various judicially created doctrines to deal with the problem).
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asserted by the United States with respect to both treaties work to
limit any obligation by the United States to bring domestic policies
in line with international standards.71
With respect to both treaties, the United States issued a proviso
that states that neither treaty requires the United States to enact
any legislation or take action that would violate the U.S.
Constitution as interpreted by the United States.72 Although the
validity of these provisos under international law has been
questioned,73 they have had great import concerning the
interpretation and steps taken in pursuit of compliance with the
CERD.
Certainly, under U.S. law, treaties are subject to
constitutional limitations and the government should not enforce
treaty provisions that are inconsistent with the Constitution.74
Nevertheless, the U.S. government remains responsible for
adhering to the terms and conditions of both the ICCPR and CERD
to the extent that the Constitution permits. While the Constitution
may restrict the government from engaging in some programs
aimed at adhering to the CERD, the government is still required to
find ways to “undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial
discrimination.”75
71 See Henkin, supra note 39, at 342 (describing the United States’ obligation to
enter reservations in international treaties whose effect could be in conflict with
the Constitution); McDougall, supra note 25, at 584 (noting “points of divergence”
between existing U.S. law and the definition of racial discrimination under the
CERD).
72 See 140 CONG. REC. 14,326 (1994) (“Nothing in this Convention requires or
authorizes legislation, or other action, by the United States of America prohibited
by the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United States.”); 138
CONG. REC. 8,071 (1992) (including exactly the same proviso).
73 See Letters from Amnesty International, Yale Law School Professors, and
Professors of Law from the University of Florida, reprinted in 138 CONG. REC.
8,068–70 (1992) (expressing deep concern with respect to the RUDs attached to the
ratification of the ICCPR); see also Connie de la Vega, Civil Rights During the 1990s:
New Treaty Law Could Help Immensely, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 423, 431 (1997) (citing
Symposium, The Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1167 (1993)) (“[D]espite the active role of the United
States in the formation and elaboration of the ICCPR, the Senate did not
immediately give its ‘advice and consent.’”). See generally William A. Schabas,
Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is the
United States Still a Party?, 21 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 277 (1995) (exploring the validity of
the U.S. RUDs to the ICCPR).
74 See Henkin, supra note 39, at 342 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957)
and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 111(2) (1987)) (proposing that
cases arising under international law or international agreements of the United
States are subject to Constitutional and statutory limitations).
75 CERD, supra note 17, art. 5.
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The U.S. Supreme Court has reduced the scope of government
conduct that constitutes impermissible discrimination under the
U.S. Constitution. In order for a law or practice to be deemed
impermissibly discriminatory under the U.S. Constitution, the
Supreme Court has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause of the
U.S. Constitution to require that such a law or practice have been
enacted or administered with a discriminatory purpose.76
Accordingly, in order for an individual or group to petition the
judiciary for relief from a law or practice that has the effect of
discriminating on the basis of race, that individual or group must
also show discriminatory intent. This interpretation clearly limits
the definition of “racial discrimination” within the CERD, which
includes “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based
on race . . . which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing
. . . human rights and fundamental freedom.”77 U.S. reliance on the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of unconstitutional discrimination
severely limits U.S. compliance with the CERD and ICCPR. As an
NGO response organized by the U.S. Human Rights Network to
the most recent U.S. report to the Committee on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination points out, requiring that a
plaintiff prove discriminatory intent “understate[s] the cumulative
impact of discrimination.”78 Discrimination that results from
institutional interactions and cumulative events may not be
intentional, and yet still have a serious disparate impact on racial
and ethnic minorities.79

76 See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (holding that proof of
discriminatory impact of the administration of the death penalty in Georgia was
insufficient by itself to show the existence of a policy that violates the Equal
Protection clause); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that proof of
discriminatory impact of an applicant examination on African Americans was
insufficient by itself to show the existence of a policy that violates the Equal
Protection Clause).
77 CERD, supra note 17, art. 1 (emphasis added). Note, however, that Article
4 of the CERD does restrict the enactment and implementation of “special
measures” that create permanent separate rights for a group. Id. art. 4; see also
ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 26. (declaring in international law the equality of all
members of a country and that they should not be discriminated against).
78 LISA CROOMS, U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS NETWORK, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: A
SUMMARY OF U.S. NGO RESPONSES TO THE U.S. 2007 COMBINED PERIODIC REPORTS TO
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION para. 10 (2008), available at http://www.ushrnetwork.org/files
/ushrn/images/linkfiles/CERD/0_Executive%20Summary.pdf.
79 Id.
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The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause also curtails the government’s ability to enact and engage in
affirmative action programs, which—by design—involve
intentional discrimination. Although the Supreme Court has not
banned affirmative action programs altogether, current doctrine
allows for such programs only in limited circumstances. A
governmental affirmative action program must pass the test of
“strict scrutiny.”80 In reviewing affirmative action programs with
strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court has held that affirmative action
programs violate the Equal Protection Clause unless the
governmental program is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling
governmental interest.81 The Court currently recognizes two
compelling interests that justify affirmative action programs: the
attainment of a diverse learning environment in education;82 and,
efforts aimed at remedying specific instances of past discrimination
in the context of government contracting and employment.83 In
contrast, the standards laid out in the ICCPR and CERD do not
submit race-based affirmative action programs to an analysis
under the tiers of scrutiny.84 The CERD specifically exempts from
its definition of discrimination any governmental actions taken
that “may be necessary in order to ensure . . . equal enjoyment or
exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms . . . . ”85
Similarly, the U.N. Human Rights Committee interprets the ICCPR
to permit affirmative action programs that have a legitimate end

80 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (holding
that strict scrutiny should apply to affirmative action programs and that “[r]acial
and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the
most exacting judicial examination”).
81 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
783 (2007) (Kennedy, J. concurring) (affirming in the controlling opinion that “[i]t
is well established that when a governmental policy is subjected to strict scrutiny,
‘the government has the burden of proving that racial classifications ‘are narrowly
tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests’”).
82 See id. (“Diversity, depending on its meaning and definition, is a
compelling educational goal a school district may pursue.”).
83 See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding that a
compelling interest exists to remedy past discrimination only if the governmental
entity employing the affirmative action program can identify past discrimination
within its jurisdiction against the racial minority it seeks to benefit).
84 See Halpin, supra note 34, at 33. (“In international human rights law,
analysis of discrimination does not formally use tiers of scrutiny as practiced by
U.S. courts.”).
85 CERD, supra note 17, art. 1(4).
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and reasonable means—similar to the less-demanding rational
basis standard applied in U.S. courts.86
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has reshaped Congress’s
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact
legislation that prohibits discriminatory conduct by State and local
governments and governmental actors. As a general matter,
Rehnquist Court precedents established that Congress may only
outlaw governmental conduct that is intentionally designed to
discriminate on the basis of race. More specifically, under a line of
cases beginning with City of Boerne v. Flores, Congress may prohibit
governmental conduct that has only the effect—and not necessarily
the purpose—of discriminating on the basis of race if the means
adopted by Congress to prohibit effects-based discrimination is
“congruent and proportional” to the evil it seeks to remedy.87
Thus, Section 5 grants Congress broad power to remedy and deter
constitutional violations, even if the underlying conduct it
prohibits is not itself unconstitutional. In 2006, Congress exercised
its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when
reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act—thereby renewing a statutory
scheme that generally prohibits conduct and activity that has the
purpose or effect of denying the right to vote on the basis of race.88
As discussed, the Court in NAMUDNO upheld the preclearance
component of the VRA, but signaled a willingness to invalidate the
component in a future case.89 Thus, if given the opportunity in a
future case, the Roberts Court may further limit the extent to which
Congress can proscribe effects-based racial discrimination
perpetrated by state and local governments.
In addition to the aforementioned proviso with respect to both
treaties, the U.S. attached to both the ICCPR and CERD an
understanding that qualifies the federal government’s obligation to

86 See Halpin, supra note 34, at 35 (“[T]he U.N. Human Rights Committee
interprets the ICCPR as requiring a ‘legitimate’ end and a ‘reasonable’ means,
which parallels low-level equal-protection scrutiny in American constitutional
law.”).
87 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that Congress
may only provide remedies for rights recognized by the judiciary branch and that
Congress may only enact statutory schemes to enforce such rights that are
“congruent and proportional” to preventing and remedying the violation of such
court-defined rights).
88 See infra Section 3.
89 See supra text accompanying notes 8–13 (discussing the holding and
reasoning of the Court in NAMUDNO).
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adhere to both treaties only to the extent that the federal
government may exercise jurisdiction over state and local
governments.90 Article 2(1) of the CERD specifically requires that
State Parties facilitate and coordinate compliance with the CERD at
state and local levels.91 The ICCPR similarly binds all State Parties
to ensure compliance at all levels of government.92 Effectively, the
U.S.’s “federalism understanding” (i.e., the formal understanding
asserted by the U.S.) significantly exempts the national
government from compelling state and local governments—which
are responsible for adopting and executing a considerable portion
of laws, policies, and practices that affect individuals in the U.S.—
to adhere to both treaties.
Perhaps as a result of this
understanding, the U.S. has done little to implement the ICCPR
and CERD at state and local levels.93 Although President Clinton
established an Interagency Working Group on Human Rights that
coordinated federal agency adherence to international human
rights treaties, the Working Group remained limited to federal
compliance with international law.94 Moreover, President George
W. Bush largely abandoned the order, and it remains to be seen the

90 The Senate ratified both the ICCPR and CERD with the same
“Understanding,” which states in relevant part that each treaty “shall be
implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises jurisdiction
over the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state and local
governments. To the extent that state and local governments exercise jurisdiction
over such matters, the Federal Government shall, as necessary, take appropriate
measures to ensure the fulfillment of [each treaty].” See CERD RUDs, supra note
64 (laying out the U.S. reservations, declarations, and understandings with respect
to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination); ICCPR RUDs, supra note 61 (laying out the U.S. reservations,
declarations, and understandings with respect to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights).
91 See CERD, supra note 17, art. 2(1)(a) (“Each State Party undertakes to
engage in no act or practice of racial discrimination against persons, groups of
persons or institutions and to en sure [sic] that all public authorities and public
institutions, national and local, shall act in conformity with this obligation.”).
92 See ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 2(1) (declaring that each State Party agrees
“to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the [ICCPR]”).
93 See, e.g., Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 72nd Sess.,
Concluding Observations of the Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination:
United States of America, para. 13, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/USA/CO/6 (May 8, 2008)
(recommending “that the State party establish appropriate mechanisms to ensure
a co-ordinated approach towards the implementation of the Convention at the
federal, state and local levels”).
94 See Exec. Order No. 13107, 63 Fed. Reg. 68,991, 68,991–92 (Dec. 10, 1998).
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extent to which President Obama will further the order’s goals.95
Accordingly, no institution exists within the U.S. to monitor
compliance with the ICCPR and CERD at state and local
governments.
The United States’ federalism understanding is not necessarily
compelled by the Constitution. Although the Supreme Court’s
recent jurisprudence has constrained the power of the federal
government to regulate states and local governments,96 the federal
government’s jurisdiction over state and local governments
remains broad.97 Moreover, under Holland, the Tenth Amendment
hardly limits Congressional efforts to compel states to adhere to
international treaties.98 Given the powers available to Congress
under the Commerce Clause, Fourteenth Amendment, and its
treaty power, the federal government likely could coordinate and
compel more robust state and local compliance with the CERD and
ICCPR.
Finally, the United States attached a declaration to the
ratification of both treaties stating that the substantive terms of the
treaties are not self-executing.99
This non-self-executing
declaration restricts the use of U.S. judicial power from enforcing
violations of both treaties. As a result of the non-self-executing
declaration, individuals lack an independent, private cause of
95 See Eric P. Schwartz, Building Human Rights into the Government
Infrastructure, in THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: U.S. POLICY FOR A NEW ERA 233,
235 (William F. Schultz ed., 2008) (noting that the Bush administration did not
implement the “program of action” envisioned by the order).
96 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that
Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause in passing the Violence
Against Women Act); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that
Congress exceeded its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment by allowing
for a civil suit provision against states when enacting the Religious Freedom and
Restoration Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating, for the
first time since the Great Depression, congressional action pursuant to the
Commerce Clause).
97 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding Congress’s power
to ban the use of marijuana even when States permit its use inside their own
border); Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (finding that
Congress did not exceed its enforcement powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment when enacting the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993).
98 See generally Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (finding Congress
unrestrained by its enumerated powers, specifically the Tenth Amendment, when
working to effectuate the terms of a treaty).
99 See CERD RUDs, supra note 65 (declaring the U.S. acceptance of the treaty
to be not self-executing); ICCPR RUDs, supra note 69 (declaring the U.S.
acceptance of the treaty to be not self-executing).
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action to enforce either human rights treaty.100 The U.S. non-selfexecuting declaration effectively precludes U.S. courts from
providing judicial relief for violations of the rights established by
both treaties. Rather, in order for either treaty to have any legal
effect in U.S. courts, Congress must pass separate “implementing
legislation.”101
In sum, through a combination of RUDs and a proviso, the U.S.
has weakened the force with which the CERD and ICCPR apply.
3.

BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME THROUGH THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT
3.1. A Unique Mechanism

The Voting Rights Act has altered American democracy by
creating a robust mechanism to enforce the promise of the
Fifteenth Amendment. Principally, the VRA enforces the right to
vote through three mechanisms. First, Section 2 of the VRA allows
aggrieved individuals and the federal government to enforce the
VRA’s prohibition of voting practices or procedures that have the
purpose or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or ethnicity.102 Section 2 applies nationwide.
Second, when enacted in 1965, Section 4 of the VRA contained a
formula that identified state and local jurisdictions with
particularly egregious histories of denying the right vote on the
basis of race and, within those jurisdictions, suspended the use of
certain “tests or devices” that determine the eligibility of the right
to vote (such as literacy tests and tests for “moral character”).103
Third, Section 5 provides that the jurisdictions covered by Section 4
must obtain “preclearance” from the federal government before
making changes in voting practices or procedures.104 To obtain

100 See Henkin, supra note 39 at 346–47 (noting that the non-self-executing
declaration is “designed to keep its own judges from judging the human rights
conditions in the [United States] by international standards.”); Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692, 734 (2004) (holding that “although the [ICCPR] does bind
the United States as a matter of international law, the United States ratified the
Covenant on the express understanding that it was not self-executing and so did
not itself create obligations enforceable in the federal courts”).
101 McDougall, Toward a Meaningful International Regime, supra note 26, at 588.
102 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).
103 Id.
104 Id. §§ 1973b–1973c (2006).
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preclearance from the federal government, a covered jurisdiction
must show that a proposed change in election law has neither a
discriminatory purpose nor discriminatory effect.105
Together, these provisions of the VRA aim to destroy barriers
to full exercise of the right to vote. For nearly one hundred years
under Jim Crow, African-American suffrage in the South was
nearly eradicated through a combination of state-sponsored laws,
intimidation, fraud, and violence.106 For all intents and purposes,
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were a “dead letter” in
the South.107 Prior to enacting the VRA, Congress attempted to
facilitate case-by-case litigation by the Attorney General against
intransigent southern jurisdictions to force compliance with the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments through the Civil Rights
Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964. Through the Civil Rights Act of 1957,
Congress authorized the Attorney General to enjoin public and
private practices that interfered with the right to vote on the basis
of race.108 The Civil Rights Act of 1960 allowed federal authorities
to inspect local voter rolls and impose penalties upon individuals
and jurisdictions that impeded access to registration.109 Finally,
Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 further attempted to remedy
discrimination in voting by requiring equal application of voting
requirements and providing expedited judicial procedures for
cases involving the right to vote.110
The litigation brought by the Justice Department under the
Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964 to remedy discrimination
in voting resulted in only piecemeal gains. The Supreme Court
noted the problems inherent in relying solely on litigation initiated
by the Attorney General, observing that:

Id.
See Chandler Davidson, The Recent Evolution of Voting Rights Law Affecting
Racial and Language Minorities, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 1965–1990, at 21 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman,
eds., 1994) (describing the whittling away of African–American suffrage after the
civil war).
107 Id. at 21–22.
108 Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub L. No. 85–315, 71 Stat. 634, 637 (1957)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2006)).
109 Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86–449; 74 Stat. 86, 88 (1960) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C. (2006)).
110 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241, 241 (1964).
105
106
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Voting suits are unusually onerous to prepare, sometimes
requiring as many as 6,000 man-hours spent combing
through registration records in preparation for trial.
Litigation has been exceedingly slow, in part because of the
ample opportunities for delay afforded voting officials and
others involved in the proceedings. Even when favorable
decisions have finally been obtained, some of the States
affected have merely switched to discriminatory devices
not covered by the federal decrees or have enacted difficult
new tests designed to prolong the existing disparity
between white and Negro registration. Alternatively,
certain local officials have defied and evaded court orders
or have simply closed their registration offices to freeze the
voting rolls.111
Thus, by enacting a comprehensive scheme to attack
discrimination through the VRA, Congress dramatically changed
course in attempting to remedy almost a century of intransigent
state actors who defied federal court orders.
Congress determined that “the unsuccessful remedies which it
had prescribed in the past would have to be replaced by sterner
and more elaborate measures in order to satisfy the commands of
the Fifteenth Amendment.”112 Congress opted for a strong
enforcement mechanism that, as noted, allowed for enforcement by
private individuals and suspension of discriminatory tests. By
providing for private enforcement of the VRA’s prohibitions
through Section 2, the framers of the VRA opted not to rely solely
on the Attorney General to deter, enforce, and remedy racial
discrimination in voting. Instead, Congress decided to enlist a
cadre of private attorneys general.
With knowledge that
jurisdictions were keen to replace banned voting practices with
new, more creatively discriminatory practices, Congress included
the “strong medicine”113 of Section 5, which shifts the burden onto
covered states and their political subdivisions to prove to the
federal government that their voting practices and procedure are
111 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 314 (1966) (internal citations
omitted).
112 Id. at 309.
113 Voting Rights: Hearings on H.R. 6400 Before the Subcomm. No. 5 of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 110–11 (1965) (statement of Rep. Chelf,
Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary).
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not discriminatory. As such, Section 5 “stands alone in American
history in its alteration of the authority between the federal
government and the states and the unique procedures it requires of
states and localities that want to change their laws.”114
Having endured for over 40 years of judicial interpretation and
through five congressional reauthorizations, the VRA’s core
provisions remain largely intact. Although the Supreme Court has
tangled over the meaning of the reach of the VRA’s prohibitions,
Congress has made clear that both Section 2 and Section 5 prohibit
governmental practices and procedures that have the purpose and
effect of discriminating on the basis of race.115 The VRA’s definition
of discrimination, Section 2’s granting of a private right of action,
and Section 5’s mandate that local jurisdictions must adhere to
federal standards all combine to provide not only an extraordinary
response to discrimination in voting in the United States, but also a
vehicle for the United States to comply with its international
obligation not to discriminate in voting on the basis of race.
3.2. The VRA as a Mechanism for Compliance
The “strong medicine” prescribed by the framers of the VRA
helps the United States comply with its international obligation not
to discriminate in voting based on race in ways that would
otherwise be unattainable. The VRA largely overcomes the
roadblocks of federalism understandings, non-self-execution
declarations, and a refusal to comply with the international
definition of discrimination.
Persily, supra note 16, at 177.
In 1982, Congress amended Section 2 of the VRA to affirm its intention
that Section 2 allows a plaintiff to sustain her burden of showing discrimination in
voting if she can show that a “voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or
standard, practice, or procedure shall [is] imposed or applied . . . in a manner
which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United
States to vote on account of race or color.” Pub. L. No. 97–205, 96 Stat. 131, 134
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006)) (emphasis added). Note, however, that
“calling section 2’s test a ‘results test’ is somewhat of a misnomer because the test
does not look for mere disproportionality in electoral results. Rather, plaintiffs
must establish that under the totality of the circumstances, the challenged
procedure prevents minorities from effectively participating in the political
process.” United States v. Blaine County, 363 F.3d 897, 909 (9th Cir. 2004). In
2006, Congress amended Section 5 of the VRA to affirm its intention that changes
in voting practice or procedure by a jurisdiction covered by Section 5 shall be
approved only if they “neither has the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.” Pub. L. No. 109–246, §§4–
5, 120 Stat. 577, 580–81 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §1973c (2006)) (emphasis added).
114
115
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First, unlike most other federal civil rights statutes that only
outlaw intentional discriminatory conduct, both Section 2 and
Section 5 of the VRA prohibit conduct that has the purpose or effect
of discriminating on the basis of race. Thus, the definition of
discrimination contained under both Section 2 and Section 5 of the
VRA comports closely with the definitions of discrimination in the
CERD and ICCPR. Combined, the ICCPR and CERD require State
parties not to engage in and to eliminate governmental and private
conduct that has the purpose or effect of discrimination in voting
on the basis of race.116 Yet, in assenting to both the ICCPR and
CERD, the United States issued a proviso limiting its compliance to
both treaties to the extent that the U.S. Constitution permits.117 The
Supreme Court has read the Constitution only to prohibit
governmental conduct that was enacted or administered with a
discriminatory purpose.118
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
responded to the United States’ most recent CERD report by:
[R]eiterat[ing] the concern . . . that the definition of racial
discrimination used in the federal and state legislation and
in court practice is not always in line with that contained in
[the CERD], which requires States parties to prohibit and
eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms, including
practices and legislation that may not be discriminatory in
purpose, but in effect.119
By adhering to a limited definition of discrimination, the United
States fails to adhere to the full reach of the international
requirement for nondiscrimination.
Given the extraordinary mechanism that Congress sought fit to
employ to attack racial discrimination in voting, the VRA’s
definition of discriminatory conduct allows the U.S. to facilitate
compliance with its international obligations. In 1980, the Supreme
Court held in Mobile v. Bolden that a violation of Section 2 of the
116 See supra text accompanying notes 49–50 (explaining the salient terms of
the ICCPR and CERD).
117 See supra note 72 (noting the limits on the application of the ICCPR and
CERD).
118 See supra text accompanying notes 76–86 (detailing the nuances of the
Supreme Court’s approach to “impermissible discrimination”).
119 Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, supra note 93, para.
10.
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VRA can only be proven by showing that a voting practice or
procedure was adopted or applied with an intent to discriminate
on the basis of race.120 In amending the VRA in 1982, Congress
explicitly responded to Bolden and clarified the language of the
VRA so that a plaintiff need not show that a voting practice or
procedure was adopted or maintained with intent to discriminate
against minority voters.121 Instead, Congress affirmed that a voting
law or procedure that results in the denial or abridgment of the
right of any citizen to vote on account of race violates Section 2 of
the VRA.122 Similarly, Section 5 of the VRA holds that a proposed
change in voting practice or procedure submitted to the federal
government can only be approved if it “neither has the purpose
nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color.”123
Second, Section 5 provides a tool for the federal government to
enforce its international-like standard of discrimination upon states
and local jurisdictions in a way unlike any other federal statute and
in a way that aids the federal government in ensuring that all
jurisdictions for which it is responsible are in compliance with
international law. Both the ICCPR and CERD require that State
Parties facilitate compliance with international standards at state
and local levels.124
Yet, the United States’ “federalism
understanding” attempts to qualify U.S. compliance with both
treaties by exempting any requirement from compelling states to
comply with the terms of assented-to treaties.125 The Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination responded to the U.S.
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60 (1980).
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, 97 Pub. L. No. 205, 96 Stat. 131
(1982). See also Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986) (construing the Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1982 and observing that “[Section 2] was largely a
response to [the Supreme Court’s] plurality opinion in Mobile v. Bolden . . . which
had declared that, in order to establish a violation either of § 2 or of the
Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments, minority voters must prove that a contested
electoral mechanism was intentionally adopted or maintained by state officials for
a discriminatory purpose”).
122 See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 35 (1986) (noting that in passing the Voting Rights
Act Amendments of 1982, “Congress substantially revised § 2 to make clear that a
violation could be proved by showing discriminatory effect alone“).
123 42 U.S.C. 1973c(a) (2006).
124 See supra text accompanying notes 51–53 (discussing the requirements of
these treaties).
125 See supra text accompanying notes 92–100 (detailing how this exemption
functions).
120
121
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government’s most recent report by noting that each “State party is
bound to apply the Convention throughout its territory and to
ensure its effective application at all levels, federal, state, and local,
regardless of the federal structure of its Government.”126 The
Committee lamented the lack of a coordinated effort within the
United States to ensure thorough compliance with the terms of the
CERD.127
In Section 5 and, to a lesser extent, Section 2, the federal
government has tools to coordinate widespread adherence to
international voting norms. As noted, Section 5 is unique among
federal legislation in that it implants the federal government
directly inside of the lawmaking process of state and local
governments. In states and political subdivisions covered by
Section 5, the federal government—acting through the Department
of Justice—has authority over local voting practice and procedures.
In addition, where Section 5 does not apply, the federal
government can maintain a say over state and local voting
practices and procedures by bringing suit through Section 2 of the
VRA. Although the avenues for proving discrimination in Section
2 and Section 5 differ, the VRA largely provides the federal
government with the ability to shape a national voting rights
policy.128 Coupled with the definition of nondiscrimination of the
VRA to which states and local governments must adhere, this
ability to influence state and local voting policy critically helps the
United States comply with international law.

126 Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination: United States of America, supra note 93, para. 13.
127 See id. (“The Committee recommends that the State party establish
appropriate mechanisms to ensure a coordinated approach towards the
implementation of the Convention at the federal, state and local levels.”).
128 Unlike Section 5, Section 2 applies nationwide and places the burden on
the plaintiff (i.e., the voter) to establish a statutory violation. While a full
exposition of the differences in governmental conduct prohibited by Section 2
versus Section 5 is beyond the scope of this Comment, the conduct banned by
each Section slightly differs. Thus, a state or local jurisdiction’s violation of
Section 2 does not necessarily provide grounds for the DOJ to deny preclearance
under Section 5; and a state or local jurisdiction’s compliance with Section 2 does
not necessarily guard against a violation of Section 5. See, e.g., Georgia v.
Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 477–79 (2003) (denying Georgia’s claim that its redistricting
plan should have been precleared under § 5 simply because it may have satisfied
§ 2 of VRA); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 477 (1997) (Bossier
Parish I) (denying the government’s assertion that “a violation of § 2 is an
independent reason to deny preclearance under § 5”).
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Third, Section 2 allows individuals to enforce the VRA’s
definition of discrimination in U.S. Courts, helping litigants
overcome the United States’ declarations that the CERD and
ICCPR are non-self-executing. Section 2 importantly provides
individuals with access to judicial relief for discriminatory harm.
While both the ICCPR and CERD bind the United States as a
matter of international law, the obligations that each treaty confers
upon the U.S are not enforceable in federal courts, since the United
States attached an understanding to ratification of both treaties
stating that neither treaty is self-executing.129 While Section 2
certainly does not allow individuals to avail themselves of federal
jurisdiction solely for violations of international nondiscrimination
norms in the context of voting, it does allow individuals an avenue
toward relief for the harm that results from practices and
procedures that would nonetheless probably violate international
norms. Moreover, Section 2 provides individuals with relief from
such discriminatory conduct. In contrast, governmental conduct
that violates international norms set out in the ICCPR and CERD
cannot be met with federal judicial relief.
3.3. The Uncertainty of Facilitated Compliance
The continued utility of the VRA as a facilitator of U.S.
compliance with international voting rights norms is uncertain.
Future success of the VRA will be tied to the vigor with which the
Act is enforced and interpreted. The Civil Rights Division at the
Department of Justice, which enforces Section 5 of the VRA and
can enforce Section 2 of the VRA through litigation, was accused of
under-enforcing the VRA and allowing politics to influence legal
judgments during the Bush administration.130 For example, in
2003, political appointees at the Department of Justice overruled a
recommendation made by career attorneys to reject under Section 5
a Georgia law that would have required voters to show a photoidentification when voting.131 A federal district court subsequently
129 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 736 (2004) (holding that the
Alien Tort Statute does not create a separate basis of relief for violations of
international law).
130 See LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS EDUCATION FUND, LONG ROAD
TO JUSTICE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION AT 50, at 10–11 (2007) (accusing the Civil
Rights division of letting politics affect its choices under the Bush administration
and laxly enforcing the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
131 See Dan Eggen, Staff Opinions Banned in Voting Rights Cases, WASH. POST,
Dec. 10, 2005, at A3 (discussing the Justice Department barring staff attorneys
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found a substantial likelihood that the voter-identification law
violated the Constitution.132 In addition, an internal investigation
by the Department of Justice recently found that Civil Rights
Division appointees violated federal law and Department of Justice
policies by considering the political affiliations of career attorneys
when making personnel decisions.133
Under the Obama Administration, Attorney General Eric
Holder has pledged to depoliticize the Civil Rights Division,
committing to return the Division “back to doing what it has
traditionally done” by increasing enforcement of statutes like the
VRA.134 However, as an Obama Transition Team report noted,
morale among career attorneys in the Civil Rights Division
plummeted during the Bush Administration, leading to a
substantial exodus of career civil rights attorneys who were
“‘inexperienced or poorly qualified.’”135 The Report predicted the
Obama Administration would face barriers to effective
enforcement of civil rights laws, noting that the net effect of the
politicized hiring process and the brain drain is an attorney work
force largely ill equipped to handle the complex, big-impact
litigation that should comprise a significant part of the Division’s
work.136 Without vigorous enforcement of the VRA, the statute’s
ability to help the United States comply with international law is
limited.
More lasting and significant limitations on the ability of the
VRA to facilitate U.S. adherence to international voting rights

from offering recommendations in major Voting Rights Act cases, including the
Georgia photo-identification law).
132 See Common Cause v. Billips, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2005)
(holding that the Georgia photo-identification law likely violates the
Constitution).
133 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL & OFFICE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED
HIRING AND OTHER IMPROPER PERSONNEL ACTIONS IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION 65
(2008), http://www.justice.gov/opr/oig-opr-iaph-crd.pdf (finding that former
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Bradley Schlozman illegally
considered the political affiliation of attorneys and applicants to the Department
of Justice when making personnel decisions).
134 See Charlie Savage, White House to Shift Efforts on Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
Sep. 1, 2009, at A1, A14 (discussing how the Obama administration is planning a
major revival of high-impact civil rights enforcement, which had been
discouraged under the Bush administration).
135 Id.
136 Id.
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standards may yet come from the Supreme Court. In NAMUDNO,
eight Justices endorsed an opinion authored by Chief Justice
Roberts that expressed “serious constitutional questions” over the
VRA’s requirement in Section 5 that all or part of sixteen States
seek preclearance from the federal government before
implementing changes in voting procedure. The case was brought
by a small municipal utility district (“MUD”) in Travis County,
Texas, which had no demonstrated history of racial discrimination
in voting, but is subject to the VRA’s preclearance requirements
because it is located within Texas, a covered jurisdiction. Section
4(a) of the VRA allows “political subdivisions” of covered
jurisdictions to bailout from Section 5’s requirements if certain
statutory requirements—mainly that a jurisdiction has no recent
history of racial discrimination in voting—are met.137 A separate
section, defines “political subdivision” as “any county or parish,
except that where registration for voting is not conducted under
the supervision of a county or parish, the term shall include any
other subdivision of a State which conducts a registration for
voting.”138
The MUD, which does not register voters and is governed by a
five-member board chosen through elections administered by
Travis County, sought “bailout” from Section 5’s preclearance
requirement and asserted, in the alternative, that Section 5 was
unconstitutional.139 At its core, the MUD’s “primary argument”
was that “there [was] no warrant for continuing to presume that
jurisdictions first identified four decades ago as needing
extraordinary federal oversight through §5 remain uniformly
incapable or unwilling to fulfill their obligations to faithfully
protect the voting rights of all citizens in those parts of the
country.”140 That is, the MUD argued that the conditions that
justified Congress in providing the VRA’s extraordinary remedy in
1965 and in subsequent reauthorizations, no longer existed.

42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(2) (2006).
139 See Appellant’s Reply Brief at 1–2, Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No.
One v. Mukasey, No. 08–322 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2009).
140 Appellant’s Brief Opposing Motions to Affirm at 1, Northwest Austin
Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, No. 08-332 (U.S. Dec. 9, 2008)
137
138
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The Supreme Court held that the definition of “political
subdivision” in Section 14(c)(2) did not govern bailout eligibility.141
Instead, according to Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion, “all
political subdivisions—not only those described in § 14(c)(2)—are
eligible to file a bailout suit.”142 Despite the otherwise clear
meaning of § 14(c)(2)—i.e., that jurisdictions like the MUD, which
are not parishes or counties and do not register voters, cannot
bailout—the Court ruled that the MUD could, in fact, bailout from
preclearance. As such, the Court remanded the MUD’s claim for
determination of whether the MUD, as a “political subdivision,”
was eligible for bailout and avoided issuing a ruling on the
constitutional question raised by the MUD.143
However, in so doing, the Court expressed “serious
misgivings” that Section 5 “imposes substantial federalism costs”
by authorizing federal participation into state and local decisions
related to voting and elections.144 The Chief Justice questioned
whether “adequate justification to retain the preclearance
requirements” remained, observing that “[t]hings have changed in
the [jurisdictions covered by Section 5]. Voter turnout and
registration rates [for African-American and white voters]
approach parity. Blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal
decrees are rare.
And minority candidates hold office at
unprecedented levels.”145
Commentators have interpreted such language—no doubt
irrelevant to the Court’s actual holding that the MUD was eligible
to bailout from coverage—as a warning that the Court is prepared
to invalidate preclearance in a future case.146
Future rulings that constrain the VRA may further hinder the
ability of the United States to adhere to its international human
rights treaty obligations. A future ruling that modifies or limits
Congress’s ability to proscribe effects-based discrimination—i.e.,
mandating that Congress can only proscribe what the Constitution
already prohibits and not what is congruent and proportional to
the Constitution’s prohibitions—will further remove the United
141 See Northwest. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504,
2515 (2009).
142 Id. at 2516.
143 Id. at 2516–17.
144 Id. at 2511 (quoting Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999)).
145 Id.
146 See supra text accompanying note 14.
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States from compliance with the CERD and ICCPR as both treaties
pertain to the right to vote. But even a future ruling that leaves the
effects-based definition of discrimination intact while invalidating
Section 5 would still gravely harm both the domestic and
international impact of the VRA. The Act’s ability to enforce the
effects-based definition of discrimination at all levels of
government through preclearance would be hampered. In turn,
U.S. implementation of its obligation to enforce the CERD and
ICCPR at the state and local level would suffer. Enforcement of the
VRA’s prohibition on racial discrimination in voting at the state
and local level would be left entirely to Section 2. But during the
last twenty years the Court has routinely interpreted Section 2
narrowly, and there is no reason to think the Court will not
continue to limit Section 2.147
Undoubtedly, there are steps the United States can take that
would decrease the role that the VRA plays in facilitating U.S.
compliance with international voting rights standards. The United
States can increase its adherence to international voting rights
standards by reconsidering the RUDs it attached to both the CERD
and ICCPR and declaring each treaty to be self-executing.
Congress could enact implementing legislation for each treaty, or
use its treaty power to bind states to adhere to international
standards. Similarly, the executive branch could establish federal
monitoring and implementation bodies that would ensure U.S.
compliance with both treaties across the federal government and
down to state and local governments.148
Until the United States takes steps to impose international
standards onto U.S. policies and practices from the outside, the
VRA must not be forgotten as a vehicle for ushering in compliance
with international voting rights standards from the inside. The
VRA has served as, and can continue to be, a tool for achieving and
147 See, e.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009) (interpreting Section 2
of the VRA to require minority groups to constitute a numerical majority of the
voting-age population in a geographically compact area before proceeding on a
claim of vote dilution).
148 For one example of such a proposal, see The Law of the Land: U.S.
Implementation of Human Rights Treaties Before the Subcommittee on Human Rights
and the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 6–7 (2009) (statement of
Wade Henderson, President & CEO, Leadership Conference on Civil and Human
Rights), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/12-16-09%20Henderson
%20Testimony.pdf, wherein Mr. Henderson advocates the expansion of the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights’ mandate to include oversight of U.S. adherence to
international human rights standards).
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protecting the universal right to vote. Those interested in
“bringing human rights home” are right to focus on applying
international law to the United States from the outside; but they
must also recognize that which can be lost if the VRA is underenforced or interpreted so that it is impotent as a tool for
implementing a national voting rights policy. In short, the harm
that may result from a weakened VRA will impact more than
domestic policy. An ineffective or less-effective VRA will also limit
the ability of the United States to adhere to its international human
rights obligations.
4.

CONCLUSION

By assenting to the CERD and ICCPR, the United States
undertook an obligation to take positive steps to hold itself to an
international standard of human rights. The United States bound
itself to protect and uphold the fundamental human right to
political participation, regardless of race, color, descent, nationality
or ethnic origin. Yet, the U.S. government has also taken steps to
avoid compliance with the international human rights framework
to which it assented. Despite its role in the creation of the modern
human rights framework, the human rights ideals espoused by the
United States often conflict with its actual practice.
This “gap” between ideals and practices exists, in part, because
the United States has impeded, through the use of RUDs, full
implementation of its international obligations. The United States
has failed to adopt a definition of impermissible racial
discrimination that encompasses neutral governmental conduct
that has the effect of discrimination. The United States has hid
behind the notion of federalism to abstain from implementation of
human rights norms. Finally, the United States has failed to
provide judicial or other remedies that sanction violators of
international human rights or compensate victims.
At least within the sphere of voting rights, the VRA facilitates
U.S. compliance with the international human rights standards to
which it has assented. As an extraordinary remedy to the evils of
racial discrimination in voting, the VRA goes beyond the floor set
by the Constitution to employ a definition of discrimination that
closely tracks the definition of discrimination in the CERD and
ICCPR. Moreover, through Section 5 and Section 2, the VRA
allows the United States to overcome federalism barriers and
impose a national voting rights standard of nondiscrimination.
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And, through Section 2, the VRA allows judicial remedies to
investigate and punish violators of the VRA while compensating
victims.
By no means is the VRA a panacea to the United States’
lackluster compliance by the United States with international
human rights obligations, let alone more limited international
voting rights obligations. Indeed, the VRA has proven an inept
vehicle to remedy at least two of the United States’ more blatant
violations of international voting rights treaty obligations: the lack
of federal representation for residents of the District of Columbia;
and, the various state laws and policies that disenfranchise
felons.149
Furthermore, to the extent that the VRA successfully facilitates
U.S. compliance with international human rights standards, its
usefulness as a model that Congress can replicate in other areas of
international human rights is doubtful. Congressional power may
be at its zenith when enforcing nondiscrimination in voting and
not transferable to the protection of other human rights through
domestic law.150 In enacting the VRA, Congress acted pursuant to
at least two sources of Constitutional power: the Elections
Clause151 and Congress’s enforcement powers in the Fourteenth
149 Challenges to felony disenfranchisement laws through the VRA have been
met with mixed results. Compare Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 590 F.3d 989 (9th Cir.
2010) (holding that Washington State’s felon disfranchisement law is racially
discriminatory and in violation of the VRA) with Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24
(1st Cir. 2009) (denying relief through Section 2 of the VRA to those challenging
Massachusetts’ ban on felon voting), Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2006)
(en banc) (denying relief through Section 2 of the VRA on grounds that Congress
did not intend felon disenfranchisement laws to fall within the Voting Rights
Act’s scope) and Johnson v. Bush, 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that the
racist intent with which Florida’s ban on felon voting was originally instituted
was “cleansed” by Florida’s most recent revision to its Constitution, since that
revision lacked any racist intent). The Author is aware of no case in which
residents of the District of Columbia have challenged the lack of political
representation in Congress by alleging a violation of the VRA.
150 See Karlan, supra note 16, at 17 ( “[C]ongressional power is at its apogee
when Congress acts to protect fundamental rights, to protect suspect or quasisuspect classes, to regulate electoral processes that involve the selection of
members of Congress, to deal with issues relating to politics and political value
judgments that are relatively unamenable to judicial resolution under the
Constitution alone, and does so through mechanisms that ‘require the exercise of
political responsibility’ by the federal government.”).
151 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations, except as to the Places of choosing Senators.”).
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and Fifteenth Amendments.152 There are few, if any, other areas in
which Congress can define discrimination beyond the floor set by
the Constitution, interfere directly with local lawmaking, and
provide individuals with the authority to enforce such norms
through private litigation.
That the VRA represents such a seismic exertion of
Congressional power to enforce a human right underscores the
serious impediments that must be overcome in order to facilitate
compliance with international human rights norms. Given that the
ghost of Senator Bricker lives on in the form of RUDs that
extinguish congressional enforcement of U.S. international human
rights obligations through the use of the Treaty Power, the
protection of civil and human rights remains subject to other grants
of congressional authority. In particular, U.S. declarations that the
CERD and ICCPR are non-self-executing place greater importance
on congressional authority to protect human rights through the use
of its Reconstruction Amendments enforcement powers.
Yet the Supreme Court’s decision in NAMUDNO reveals
hostility towards Congress’ power under the Reconstruction
Amendments, perhaps signaling the eventual demise of the VRA
as a tool for facilitating U.S. adherence to the CERD and ICCPR in
the area of voting. Although the Court in NAMUDNO avoided a
ruling that directly limited the extent to which Congress can
constitutionally provide a federal remedy for state and local racial
discrimination in voting, Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion expresses
serious misgivings about the VRA. A future Supreme Court ruling
that restricts the power of Congress to address violations of equal
protection and fundamental rights will harm U.S. fulfillment of its
international human rights obligations.
A critical tool for
“bringing human rights home” will be blunted.
The VRA has changed the composition of American
democracy. The extent to which the VRA can continue to affect
change and facilitate U.S. adherence to its international voting
rights obligations remains to be seen.

152 See supra text accompanying notes 88–90 (discussing their application in
NAMUDNO).
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